The Geopolitical Tensions Threatening Security in the Horn of Africa

On 11th December, after intense negotiations brokered by Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud came to an agreement to settle a year-long diplomatic dispute between the two countries. The agreement provides a framework for negotiations aimed at addressing landlocked Ethiopia's longstanding concerns over sea access, while simultaneously responding to Somalia's concerns about safeguarding its territorial sovereignty. Whilst, the deal has been praised by the international community, many questions remain unanswered concerning the diplomatic fallout between Ethiopia and its East African neighbours. In this article, we therefore explore the origins of these geopolitical tensions and examine their potential implications for regional stability going forward.

Rising tensions

Ethiopia’s political discord with Somalia largely steams from a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland, a self-governing region claiming autonomy from Somalia. In the deal, signed at the start of the year, Somaliland reportedly agreed to lease Ethiopia a 20-km stretch of coastline, in return for Ethiopia becoming the first African country to formally recognise Somaliland’s independence. Whilst Abiy Ahmed viewed the deal as a crucial step in providing landlocked Ethiopia with direct sea access, it was predictably met with fury from Mogadishu, with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud accusing Abiy Ahmed’s government of violating Somali sovereignty.

In the following months, diplomatic hostilities between the two countries greatly increased. In April, Somalia expelled the Ethiopian ambassador from the country, whilst in September the Somali Foreign Minister announced Mogadishu was “open to” supporting rebel groups fighting against Ethiopia’s Federal Government if the MoU was not retracted. More recently Somalia’s decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) was a viewed as a clear attempt to apply diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia, who rely on a strong AU force to contain Al-Shabaab, a jihadist militant group labelled as a terrorist organisation in many countries.

However, Somalia is far from the only country in the region that has become diplomatically hostile to Ethiopia in recent years. Diplomatic tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt have been simmering for over a decade now, largely thanks to Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile river. Concerned around issues of water security, the Government in Cairo has piled diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia to come to an agreement on the dam’s operation, arguing that it has the right to veto the project due to colonial era treaties.

More recently, relations have worsened between Ethiopia and its northern neighbour Eritrea over the fallout from the Tigray War, fought between the Ethiopian Federal Government and a number of Tigrayan armed groups between 2020 and 2022. Whilst Eritrean troops fought alongside the Ethiopian National Defence Force during the conflict, due to their common animosity towards the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the exclusion of Eritrea from peace talks has left a shadow over the relationship. Since then, Eritrean troops have continued to occupy some of the border regions with Tigray in an attempt to control the perceived threat posed by the TPLF. Meanwhile, Abiy Ahmed’s repeated push for maritime access has further heightened tensions between Asmara and Addis Ababa.

Whilst these geopolitical disputes may seem somewhat unrelated, an October meeting in the Eritrean capital involving the Presidents of Eritrea, Somalia and Egypt led many political analysts to speculate that the three countries are forming “an axis against Addis Ababa”. This meeting particularly reflects the strengthening diplomatic ties between the Egyptian and Somali Governments, who in August this year signed a defence pact which looks set to involve 10,000 Egyptian troops being deployed to Somalia, half of which will operate through the new African Union mission. Thus, these shifting alliances could potentially result in Ethiopian troops in Somalia being replaced by Egyptian forces, positioning Egyptian troops along the Ethiopian-Somali border.

What’s next for Somalia?

Prior to the signing of Wednesday’s agreement, known as the Ankara Declaration, I sat down with Gerrit Kurtz, a peace and conflict researcher at the German Institute for International Security Affairs, a Berlin-based think tank, to discuss the implications of these evolving geopolitical alliances for regional stability. Even before this new agreement, Kurtz considered a direct conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia to be unlikely. Whilst “you can never exclude clashes in the region … the military balance is quite lopsided,” he argues, thanks to Ethiopia’s far superior military and Somalia’s reliance on foreign powers to assist with security.

Perhaps the bigger threat to Somalia right now lies in the deteriorating security situation that could arise from the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. Through their long-term mission against Al-Shabaab, Ethiopia has built up strong networks with local militias in Somalia, networks which could take a long time to rebuild if Ethiopian forces were replaced by Egyptian troops. Thus, as Kurtz argues, “increased Al-Shabaab activity is certainly still a possibility”, as the group could exploit this transitional period to make territorial advances.

At the same time, the new Ankara Declaration provides a definite opportunity to prevent Al-Shabaab advances. The statement released by the Turkish Foreign Ministry refers to Somalia’s recognition of “the sacrifices of Ethiopian soldiers within the African Union Missions”, sitting in sharp contrast to past statements in which the Somali Government has accused Ethiopian troops of “illegal” incursions. The international community will therefore be optimistic that this renewed dialogue fosters a more stable transition period, during which Ethiopian troops could remain in the country long enough to allow Egyptian forces to develop the local expertise needed to effectively contain Al-Shabaab.

However, to avoid an uncertain transitional period, negotiations on the new AU mission will likely have to be finalised before Somalia begins “technical negotiations” on providing Ethiopia with sea access, which could occur as late as February 2025. As the threat to expel Ethiopian troops has been a significant diplomatic tool for Somalia in recent months, Mogadishu may remain reluctant to fully retract these threats, until further talks on the Somaliland port deal have concluded.

Moreover, the situation is complicated by the existing political discord between the Somali Federal Government and the country’s federal member states, who hold considerable political autonomy. Many Somali state leaders have rejected the Federal Government’s calls for the expulsion of Ethiopian troops, due to the crucial role they play in fighting Al-Shabaab. In response, Ethiopian authorities also previously indicated that they would be willing to keep troops in Somalia if they had sufficient local and international backing, regardless of Mogadishu’s demands. Thus, as Kurtz highlights, whilst the dispute over Ethiopian troops is not the primary cause of the current discord between the Federal Government and member states, it “creates an additional complication to this difficult domestic situation.”

What’s more, whilst the dispute around Ethiopian troops may exacerbate existing political discords in Somalia, perhaps the greater concern is of Addis Ababa actively exploiting these existing disputes in an effort to weaken Mogadishu. Last month, the state of Jubaland suspended relations with the Federal Government, after a disputed local election. Since then, the Somali Government has accused Ethiopia of illegally supplying weapons into Jubaland, although this was denied by Jubaland’s security minister. While the new agreement with Mogadishu may discourage Addis Ababa from supporting member state troops in the future, any support offered to such troops could create further opportunities for Al-Shabaab, who have already begun exploiting the region's political instability. Moreover, with multiple reports of clashes between federal forces and Jubaland troops, the region’s future remains highly uncertain, even without Ethiopian interference​.

What’s next for Ethiopia?

While the Ankara Declaration may ease tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, the potential for clashes between Egyptian and Ethiopian forces remains, given the likely deployment of Egyptian troops near the Somalia-Ethiopia border as part of the upcoming AU mission. However, Kurtz argues that a large-scale direct conflict is unlikely. Such a conflict “does not seem credible as it would just lead to further questions about the government in Cairo”, which already faces significant pressures due to domestic economic problems. At the same time, other analysts highlight the possibility of a proxy conflict, in which Egypt and Ethiopia support rival Somali factions. Cairo may hope to use such proxy action in order to leverage negotiating power over Addis Ababa, with regards to the operation of the GERD.

Beyond this, other analysts have raised the potential of the Egyptian Government supporting rebel groups in Ethiopia as a means to weaken Addis Ababa. In 2021, an Ethiopian diplomat working for the Foreign Ministry alleged that Egyptian forces were assisting Gumuz militias in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz state, in an effort to thwart the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Beyond this, the Ethiopian National Defence Force is also embroiled in another large-scale civil conflict against a group of Amhara ethno-nationalist militias collectively known as the Fano, providing further opportunities for foreign powers to interfere.

However, whilst such covert action against the Ethiopian Government is definitely possible, Gerrit Kurtz questions the extent to which this could actually help Egypt achieve its wider geopolitical aims. “I think Egypt has quite limited leverage here”, he argues. “They can't stop [the construction of the GERD] anymore. This is clear to them as well.” Instead, “the Egyptian interest is in getting a binding agreement on the permanent operation of the dam, especially for periods of prolonged drought.” Kurtz doubts that even covert support for Ethiopian rebels could successfully push the Ethiopian Government towards an agreement, arguing that “if it became known … it would just lead to more confrontation.”

Perhaps the more direct threat to Ethiopia comes from potential Eritrean support for the Fano. As Kurtz underlines, the Fano has historic links with Eritrea, having received support “with Ethiopian consent during the war with Tigray.” What’s more, “because there’s still Fano in West Tigray there’s also still … a land corridor” connecting Eritrea and the Fano, providing them with the means to supply the rebel group if they so wished. Yet, as Kurtz is keen to highlight, despite Mogadishu, Asmara and Cairo sharing a common enmity towards Ethiopia, any action orchestrated by Eritrea would be taken “for Eritrean reasons and not because of Egyptian or Somalian plans.”

Moving forward

When meeting with Gerrit Kurtz, I asked him what he believed EU policymakers could do to attempt to reduce geopolitical tensions in the Horn of Africa. Whilst admitting the limitations of the EU’s influence, Kurtz argued that the EU’s chief negotiating tool is through funding. As the primary financier of the current African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, the European Union has called on other partners to share the financial burden of the upcoming AUSSOM. Kurtz maintains that they are unlikely to find the US a willing partner “especially now under Trump.” However, he believes, if the EU “continues to fund an AU presence in Somalia, which I think in general they should be open to, then it cannot contribute to regional tensions”, i.e. countries should not be able to exploit the AU mission for their own political ends. With talks still ongoing, it remains to be seen what role the EU will play in financing the new mission and what leverage they will have over its operation. However, with the Ankara Declaration, the prospects of a peaceful transition into a new AU mission look much brighter than they did a few weeks ago.

At the same time, Kurtz also highlights the important role the UAE could play in easing tensions. “They have a lot of influence both in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, perhaps especially in Addis Ababa”, thanks to the country’s huge financial and military investments in the region. However, rather than providing stability, such investments are “essentially contributing to repression and conflict”, with powerful leaders more willing to take foreign policy risks. Thus, Kurtz calls on the UAE to use their influence to “dial down these tensions.”

Going forward from here, whatever the policies of external actors, it seems the events of the next few weeks could be crucial in determining the long-term political stability of the region. It remains uncertain whether Mogadishu will maintain its stance on demanding the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops by the year's end or whether the two nations can now collaborate to ensure a smooth transition from one African Union mission into the next. However, with the Turkish-brokered agreement, there are at least now some grounds for optimism.