Japan: The Yoshida Doctrine and the LDP Crisis

Image - taro ohtani

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In Japan, the long-standing rule of the centre-right Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) historically rested on a delicate balance: the Yoshida Doctrine, drawn up in the postwar period, preached constitutional pacifism, economic development under US protection, and the renunciation of military rearmament. This silent pact allowed the LDP to build a democratic hegemony based on technical development, institutional corporatism, and social stability, without resorting to repression or authoritarian charisma. For decades, this model consolidated a prosperous and stable Japan, which became an example of sustained growth without compromising liberal democracy or regional security, supported by solid institutions and a citizenry relatively confident in the system.

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The LDP's traditional allies, primarily the technocratic bureaucracy and large business conglomerates known as keiretsu, were integrated into a system oriented toward growth and industrial modernisation, uniting interests from above. Thanks to this coordination between the state and the private sector, the Japanese economy experienced decades of expansion that cemented the LDP's political legitimacy. At the same time, Japanese soft power emerged through diplomacy focused on international cooperation, investment in development, and cultural promotion, rather than military deployment, reinforcing Japan's image as a reliable and responsible player on the global stage.

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However, this model is showing signs of fatigue. In the July 2025 election for the House of Councillors, the ruling coalition between the LDP and Komeito lost its majority, demonstrating that political inertia no longer guarantees automatic results. Fragmentation deepened with the emergence of a far-right populist party, Sanseitō, which won 14 seats, consolidating a significant presence that shifts the balance of power. This party, led by controversial YouTuber-turned-politician Sōhei Kamiya, dubbed by some as "the Japanese Donald Trump," promotes the slogan "Japanese First" and articulates a nationalist, anti-immigration discourse critical of diversity policies, defying international consensus and the country's diplomatic tradition.

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Sanseitō not only weakens the government but also polarises the political space, forcing the center and the moderate opposition to redefine their strategies. At the same time, traditional opposition parties, such as the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) and the People's Democratic Party (DPP), have achieved greater cohesion, making significant inroads in the House of Representatives and forming a stronger bloc against the LDP. However, ideological pluralism remains intense and hampers broad agreements, demonstrating that Japan is entering a period where governability requires constant negotiation and adaptability, rather than the mere application of historical doctrine.

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This political shift directly confronts the principles of the Yoshida Doctrine. The strategic alliance with the United States, key to Japan's postwar stability and economic growth, is threatened by parliamentary instability and external pressure, such as automobile tariffs, which jeopardise exports andindustrial competitiveness. Furthermore, Sanseitō's anti-immigration rhetoric conflicts with the country's demographic needs: Japan requires foreign labor to sustain its economy in the face of an aging and declining population. The doctrine that once protected the country now appears insufficient to effectively confront internal and external challenges.

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The PLD thus faces a double challenge: one of legitimacy and narrative. Its hegemony, based for decades on economic efficiency, institutional stability, and international cooperation, is being eroded by a citizenry less willing to sacrifice equity and diversity for order and technical growth. The challenge for the party is not only electoral: it is epistemological. It must update its narrative, redefine its vision of state and society, and sustain its identity as a force of stability without falling into extremes or abandoning the principles of international cooperation and diplomacy that consolidated it.

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However, Japan still has the tools to manoeuvre. The ability to negotiate with moderate forces and rebuild an inclusive narrative that combines economic development, social justice, and international openness could stabilise the political system and allow Japanese democracy to adapt to contemporary times. The Yoshida Doctrine, far from being merely a historical legacy, needs to be transformed: to abandon its rigidity and embrace a more pluralistic, participatory, and legitimate governance, capable of integrating diversity, innovation, and security.

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At a time when populism is on the rise and threatening the rules of the game, Japan has the opportunity to demonstrate that democracy, not confrontation or authoritarianism, remains the most solid path to maintaining peace and development. If the Japanese model is intelligently reconfigured, the country could offer a civilised counterweight to the exercise of power in the 21st century, demonstrating that hegemony and democracy can coexist in the face of new challenges. Otherwise, Japan's democratic exceptionalism, sustained for more than seven decades, risks eroding at a historical moment when its global example is more necessary than ever, jeopardising not only domestic politics but also its international influence and legacy as a model of stable and responsible democracy.