As of July 2025, the UK has classified the group Palestine Action as a prescribed organisation under the Terrorist Act of 2000, making it illegal to support or affiliate with. In summary, this organisation describes its motive to be Palestinian sovereignty. As this is now a prescribed organisation, it is difficult to access further information on its intentions put forward by its members.
However, even after its proscription there have been a number of protests in the UK, such as the large masses in Central London, who are in support of Palestine Action. It must be noted that not all pro-Palestine demonstrations and protests make reference to Palestine Action itself, but these are not what are overall covered by this article. As a result, masses of these protesters have been arrested for their support of the prescribed organisation, including 488 arrests in London last week, as well as 12 charged following arrests in Manchester in late September.
Palestine Action supporting protesters generally refer to amotivation of “opposing genocide,” generally suggestive of support of a ceasefire in Gaza, including by the UK ceasing the trade of arms with Israel. It is understood that these protestors oppose the proscription of Palestine Action, but to what extent is the response pictured productive for said cause?
“The UK Government assesses that Palestine Action commits and participates in acts of terrorism” and that it “prepares for terrorism”. It cites the organisation to have a “nationwide campaign of direct criminal action against businesses and institutions, including key national infrastructure and defence firms.” Furthermore, on the afternoon of Monday 8th September, the House of Commons held a debate enquiring about the political climate following the proscription of Palestine Action and subsequent mass arrests. In this, UK Minister of Security Dan Jarvis argues that it is the government’s responsibility to rule out the actions of Palestine Action as “intimidating and criminally damaging” to “Britain’s national security infrastructure” and as not that of a “’legitimate protest group.”
Crucially, Jarvis states that “supporting Palestine and supporting a proscribed terrorist organisation are not the same thing.” This notion is also supported by Dave Rich, an expert on antisemitism according to the Jewish Chronicle. Though the UK has recently recognised the state of Palestine, a motivation understood to be shared by Palestine Action, considering the government’s clear objection to the organisation, the campaign or actions of Palestine Action itself must not necessarily relate to this.
The clear opposition of the Minister of Security as well as several other members of the Commons, including Walthamstow Labour MP Stella Creasy and Croydon South’s Conservative MP Chris Philip, to Palestine Action and affiliation with its actions may suggest that protests which refer to this are unlikely to be productive, and are thus in some sense, performative.
However, these mass arrests remain significant in enabling discussion surrounding the proscription, with some opposing the UK’s use of terrorism laws. This is also highlighted in the aforementioned parliamentary discussion, for example by Liberal Democrat MP Bobby Dean.
The seemingly peaceful nature of supporting a proscribed group, by holding a placard with the message ‘I support Palestine Action’ resulting in masses of arrests, was able to encourage debate around rights surrounding freedom of speech. This does refer to the alternative motivation of at least some of these protestors, objecting to the proscription itself.
The main defender of Palestine Action against proscription in the UK remains as Defence of the Juries, which organised protests to “peacefully deny the ban,” on Saturday 6th September, resulting in 890 arrests. Additionally, there is ongoing judicial review, including those motions put forward by Amnesty International, Huda Ammori, co-founder of Palestine Action, and Defend our Juries.
Though the support of Palestine Action in protest can be deemed somewhat performative in its genocide-opposing anti-war motivation, it may be productive in an alternative discussion surrounding the direction of UK democracy.
Nevertheless, further discussion remains in regards to the productivity in Palestine Action protests, regarding the perceived intimidation posed to the UK’s Jewish community of pro-Palestine protests in general. This analysis can be limited without delving into the specifics of Palestine Action protests and pro-Palestine protests, and more so the specific problematic sentiment within these.
However, this requires some necessary context, repeatedly referenced by the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary regarding their perception of “pro-Palestinian protests”, especially since the 2nd of October. This refers to the antisemitic terror attack on Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation Synagogue in Manchester, which took the lives of two Jewish men, Adrian Daulby and Melvin Cravitz, on the holiest day in the Jewish calendar.
Following this, Starmer urged activists to "recognise and respect the grief of British Jews" and Mahmood suggested they “show some love and some solidarity to the families of those who have been murdered and to our Jewish community.”
Similar discussions surrounding insensitivity towards British Jews remains in Starmer’s speech against pro-Palestine demonstrations on October 7th. This is in respect to the 1200people killed and 251 taken hostage in Israel, by terrorist organisation Hamas on October 7th 2023. Starmer highlights that this was “the worst attack on the Jewish people since the Holocaust”.
This may only reinforce the argument that active support of Palestine Action via protest is unlikely to be productive in urging the UK government towards some generalised aims mentioned, of opposing Israel’s actions in Gaza.
This is especially so, considering that Palestine Action protests do take up significant police resources, retractingfrom numbers which are increasingly needed in protecting Jewish schools and synagogues, as promised by Starmer in response to the attack.
Recent amendments made by the UK government on Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act also offer a further significance to this analysis. This is where protesters are able to be more limited by police, for example on their duration or whereabouts. Crucially, this will allow police to shut down or ban protests outright.
This perhaps suggests that Palestine Action protests cannot be as productive for either of the discussed motivations, nor performative, if they aren’t even able to take place. Though this depends on the outcome of judicial review of its proscription, it remains significant and the future of Palestine Action protests could be very limited.
Overall, it may be argued that Palestine Action protests are somewhat performative in their motivation to “oppose genocide” by influencing the UK government to act against the actions of Israel’s for example in its trade. This is because of its insistence on referring to the proscribed organisation, clearly strongly opposed by the Cabinet. Further, the Prime Minister and government’s expressed disapproval and perceived objection to “pro-Palestinian” protests following the 2nd of October attack and on the 7th of October detract from their productive potential.
However, this choice alternatively contributes to a discussion surrounding the use of terrorism laws in the UK, and has the potential to be productive in this, if this results in judicial review of its proscription. If this is unsuccessful, it is unlikely these protests will be able to be productive in either regard following strengthened police powers.