Image - Rizky Rahmat Hidayat
Indonesia’s new Criminal Procedure Code (RUU KUHAP) is promoted by the government as a long-overdue legal reform and modernization effort. The 1981 KUHAP which governed criminal procedure for over four decades is acknowledged as outdated, given changes in constitutional systems, development of law, and advances in technology.
The new law introduces a range of changes that guarantee rights to various parties in criminal acts. Despite “positive” changes, the bill has generated widespread public skepticism. Its rapid passage, deliberate expansion of state and police power, and the country’s low institutional trust reveal deeper truths about Indonesia's political state, raising serious questions about the country’s democratic trajectory.
Officially, the government argues that Indonesia’s legal system required modernisation, alignment with international norms, and procedural efficiency; of which have been discussed for over a decade. Drafts of the bill circulated among academics and civil society, reflecting years of deliberation. However, the final legislative stage was remarkably compressed. The last draft was released to the public in less than 24 hours before the vote, committee deliberations lasted only two days, and the plenary ratified the bill shortly afterwards.
The rushed process has fueled public concern that the bill was pushed through to meet bureaucratic deadlines, and serve interests of political elites rather than its citizens. After visible disappointments throughout the years(especially the start of the current presidency), citizens increasingly doubt that the law will be applied fairly. Even if some provisions in RUU KUHAP are normatively sound, low trust in state institutions means that many Indonesians cannot believe that these reforms will genuinely improve the justice system. Not to mention, how politicians on several accounts have misused the broadness of a law to their benefit; creating a deeper trust issue between citizens and the government.
Amid the skepticism, RUU KUHAP includes several provisions that on paper strengthen legal protection and align Indonesia with international standards. One of them is the strengthening of advocates’ role during criminal proceedings (Article149, Verse 2). The new code grants advocates immunity for their legal arguments, access to evidence and case files, guaranteed communication with clients, and a more active role during interrogations and hearings. Similar reforms elsewhere, such as Japan’s pre-trial changes in the early 2000s, helped curb forced confessions and improve transparency, at least in theory pointing to a more balanced justice system.
However, the effectiveness of these reforms depends heavily on implementation. Comparative cases from the Philippines and India show that strong procedural guarantees often fail in practice where police dominance, limited legal aid, and structural inequality persist. Indonesia faces similar risks, particularly in rural areas where access to competent legal assistance remains limited. As a result, the strengthened role of advocates may primarily benefit privileged or high-profile defendants, while police and prosecutorial power continues to expand.
Ultimately, it reveals that a stronger defense bar cannot fully mitigate abuses if the foundational structure of criminal justice continues to prioritize state interests over individual rights. Before legal reforms, structural changes should be made.
Goods aside, one of the most alarming dimensions of the new KUHAP is the expansion of police powers. Under the draft, police may conduct warrantless searches under “urgent circumstances” (Article 113 (4)), a clause so broad that it invites different interpretations. Extended pre-trial detention periods grant law enforcement more time to interrogate suspects without judicial oversight. The bill also enhances surveillance capacities, enabling the state to collect information with fewer procedural barriers. Together, these changes risk reshaping the balance of power between the state and citizens.
Wiretapping and digital surveillance also becomes an area of concern (i.e. Article 136),which allows investigators to conduct wiretaps and electronic surveillance without strong judicial oversight, with the assumption that a separate law will later define procedural guarantees. This becomes an issue as Indonesia currently lacks a dedicated wiretapping law, meaning vast powers are granted before safeguards are in place. Moreover, police may intercept communications or data without prior court approval, increasing the risk of privacy violations.
This is a particular concern given Indonesia’s historical context. The memory of the New Order’s repressive military apparatus remains embedded in public consciousness, while police continue to face persistent reports of corruption and excessive force. Enhancing police and military power without equally strengthening accountability mechanisms risks empowering the very institutions citizens trust least. Because of this, RUU KUHAP could lead to patterns of politically motivated investigations or criminalization of dissent.
Beyond empowering law enforcement, the new KUHAP intrudes into areas of personal freedom and political expression. This draws back to the issue of wiretapping as it opens doors to unchecked surveillance and access to private communications across phones and digital platforms. This clearly discourages rights to freedom of expression in both public and digital space.
Another measure includes freezing bank accounts and restriction to digital platforms which disrupts livelihoods and silences critics. Although framed as a measure to preserve evidence, the law allows bank account blocking to occur under broadly defined “urgent circumstances” without prior court approval. In apolitical climate where trust in law enforcement is low, these powers raise fear of selective targeting and financial intimidation.
Taken together, the expanded coercive measures signal a clear erosion of civil liberties. They concentrate more power in the hands of investigators while providing few mechanisms for accountability. A procedural code that streamlines the state's ability to intervene exacerbates fear of the government. Democratic backsliding rarely occurs through sudden coups, it often unfolds gradually through legal and administrative changes that erode freedom while preserving the appearance of democracy. RUU KUHAP fits this pattern; the technical language masks the political implications of a stronger coercive state.
RUU KUHAP represents a critical juncture for Indonesia’s legal and political trajectory. While the bill contains commendable provisions, it expands state and police authority in ways that threaten civil liberties and democratic norms.
This pessimistic view is justified because of the combination of discretionary power and weak oversight mechanisms that creates significant risks of abuse. These concerns exacerbate deeply embedded fears of Indonesia falling back to the era of the New Order, marked by the suppression of political participation and corruption. Such anxieties are amplified by persistently low levels of public trust in government institutions, revealing structural problems that extend beyond the law itself. Without meaningful efforts by the government to rebuild trust and demonstrate genuine accountability, legal reforms like RUU KUHAP are unlikely to strengthen democracy or better the country.
The future of Indonesia’s democracy depends on how laws are implemented and how critical citizens are towards the government. Without trust, accountability, and restraint from those in power, legal reform risks deepening rather than resolving Indonesia’s democratic crisis. Essentially, this bill and reactions surrounding it reveals the need for Indonesia to do a “full cleansing” of its foundation; meaning the people in the government and their intentions for Indonesia. The nation now, stands at a moment where political stability and are turn to democracy are urgently sought.
.svg)
.svg)
Access all articles, events, career resources, and our regularly updated News Matrix. It's free!
.svg)
.svg)
