Immigration has become one of Britain's defining political issues. Government projections suggest long-term net migration – the number of people expected to settle permanently in the UK – will remain at around 300,000 people per year. Similar projections have been produced by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR).
As immigration has risen, so too has public concern. Ipsos polling conducted in August 2025 found that immigration had overtaken both the economy and the NHS as the issue Britons considered most important.
For many voters, Reform UK offers the clearest response. Led by Nigel Farage, whose political career has centred on immigration and leaving the EU through UKIP, the Brexit Party and now Reform UK, the party has made reducing immigration its defining policy objective.
Its proposals are sweeping. Reform has pledged to leave the European Court of Human Rights, withdraw from international agreements that it believes restrict border enforcement, establish a UK Deportation Command with expanded legal powers, introduce a five-year programme of detention and deportation for illegal migrants, repeal the Human Rights Act, prevent illegal migrants from claiming asylum through a new Illegal Migration (Mass Deportation) Bill, expand Immigration Removal Centres, and replace indefinite leave to remain with renewable five-year visas linked to earnings.
The message is unmistakable: Reform believes immigration is out of control and argues only fundamental change can restore confidence in Britain's borders.
The question is not whether Reform wants lower immigration. It clearly does. The question is whether its proposals address the issues that surround immigration.
The government's 2025 Immigration White Paper argues that sustained high migration has increased pressure on housing and public services, encouraged employers to recruit overseas rather than invest in domestic skills, and weakened public confidence in the immigration system.
There is some truth in this assessment. Population growth inevitably increases demand for housing, schools, healthcare and transport. More people require more services.
However, attributing the deterioration of Britain's public services primarily to immigration oversimplifies a far more complex problem.
The NHS, local government and other public services have endured years of constrained investment, ageing infrastructure, staff shortages, and repeated pay disputes. The disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic only intensified these existing weaknesses. By 2024, many public services were performing worse than they had in 2010, reflecting long-term structural challenges rather than immigration alone.
Successive governments have also favoured short-term solutions over sustained reform. The NHS Long Term Workforce Plan estimated that expanding the healthcare workforce would require annual funding increases of around 3.6 per cent, roughly twice the average growth seen between 2009/10 and 2019/20. Long-term workforce planning is possible, but it demands political commitment and substantial public investment.
Immigration may contribute to higher demand for public services, but it is not the principal reason they struggle. Even if migration were dramatically reduced tomorrow, workforce shortages, underinvestment and ageing infrastructure would remain. Immigration adds pressure, but it does not explain the underlying weaknesses.
The same distinction applies to the labour market.
Migrants play an increasingly important role across the British economy, particularly in healthcare, social care, construction, and technology. Skilled workers help fill shortages that domestic recruitment has failed to address, while migrants also contribute through taxation.
Research has generally found that immigration has only modest effects on employment and wages for UK-born workers. Where adverse impacts do occur, they are concentrated among lower-paid occupations, partly because some migrants work below their qualification level, increasing competition in lower-skilled jobs.
Housing presents a more difficult challenge. Population growth increases demand for homes, while housebuilding has consistently failed to keep pace. The result has been greater pressure on house prices and rents, even though evidence suggests immigration has had relatively limited effects on overall employment.
Despite these pressures, migrant labour remains essential in many sectors. The NHS, in particular, continues to rely heavily on internationally recruited doctors, nurses, and care workers. A sudden reduction in migration would therefore leave significant labour shortages across essential services and slow economic growth.
If Reform UK wish to reduce immigration over the long term, reducing demand for overseas workers must accompany tougher border controls. That requires sustained investment in education, apprenticeships and vocational training to develop the domestic workforce.
The government acknowledges this challenge in the Immigration White Paper, and introduces measures such as raising qualification thresholds for Skilled Worker visas, strengthening English language requirements, and restricting lower-skilled visa routes. These policies may reduce migration, but they do little to address the skills shortages that created dependence on migrant labour in the first place.
This is where Reform UK's proposals face their greatest test.
The party presents a detailed programme for reducing immigration but offers no answer to how the economy would adapt if migrant workers were no longer available in sufficient numbers. Without a credible strategy to train, recruit and retain enough UK-born workers, reducing immigration risks leaving critical sectors without the staff they need.
Reform's policies may succeed in lowering immigration. Whether they can simultaneously sustain public services, maintain economic growth, and resolve Britain's long-standing skills shortages remains a far less certain question.
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